Reply to Jim, aka James Robert Brown by Nenad Miščević






Two topics dear to James Robert Brown are discussed, and brought 
together. First, the applicability of mathematics: it is claimed that 
applicability offers an a posteriori justification of our 
mathematical beliefs, on a reflective, rather holistic level in a two 
level hierarchy. Second, the answer to Benacerraf’s dilemma. A 
non-empirical mathematical property M is realized in empirical 
reality through realizers, concrete numerical patterns. The 
realizers have been interacting causally with human thinkers 
throughout evolution, which has, through a kind of evolutionary 
abstraction process, left a proto-representation as of M in human 
mental apparatus. The innate proto-representation, and its 
ontogenetic avatars, guide actual humans in recognizing instances 
of M in the empirical reality. But does the evolutionary production 
of mechanisms for M-representation track truth? Hopefully yes; the 
applicability and indispensability of math are a testimony to the 
truth-tracking. !
Keywords: mathematics-applicability of, Benacerraf’s dilemma, 
evolutionary account !!
First apologies for the long delay in replying, to Jim and to other 
generous and patient authors! 
I owe my interest in thought-experiments and intuitions to Jim. I listened 
to his talk(s), I decided to read some of his writing, and to do a little 
thinking myself. And I ended up hooked at the topic, for almost three 
decades. We spent some exciting time in Dubrovnik, when in the middle 
of the war we held a conference on thought-experiments. And we kept 
meeting in Dubrovnik and in Canada; Jim has been keeping the 
Dubrovnik conference on philosophy of science alive and well for more 
than two decades.  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Let me now pass to the reply. I want briefly to address two topics. The 
first is the one of pure and applied math; I am honored by Jim’s 
contributing to the volume with highly original ideas. The other is 
Benacerraf’s dilemma that is in a subtle was central for Jim’s platonic 
proposal. I want to use the occasion and briefly sketch my line of thought 
about the two topics in question. Let me start with the contrast between 
pure and applied mathematics. Here is Jim: 
The pure vs. applied distinction in ethics turns out to be similar to 
the mathematicians’ pure vs applied distinction. Pure ethics and 
applied both cite concrete examples. Pure mathematics and applied 
— using the mathematicians’ distinction, not the philosophers’ — 
also both cite concrete examples. The difference between the pure 
and the applied is in our aims and interests, not in the examples. 
The ethics distinction parallels the mathematical. We distinguish 
which is which when we see how they are used. 
I agree very much. But note, the view suggests a strong presence of 
mathematical reality within the physical one. If the math example and the 
physics example differ only relative to our „aims and interests“, then 
either the apparently mathematical structure is nothing but a physical one, 
as nominalists would like to have it, or mathematical structure is strongly 
present in the physical one.  Jim and I share antipathy to nominalism in 1
the philosophy of math; so, we are left with the strong presence 
alternative. I hope we agree that there are real (mathematical) features of 
the world, that elementary math captures some real (mathematical) 
features of the world and that many elementary mathematical intuitions 
are realistically correct (true). 
Jim’s examples are relevant here, especially his second one.  
One of the most interesting approaches in recent times is that of 
Alain Connes, a contemporary French mathematician (and Fields 
Medal winner in 1982). Connes (1996) used some of the 
machinery of quantum mechanics. He sets up an infinite 
dimensional Hilbert space to represent a quantum system, not of 
physical entities, but of prime numbers. The “energy levels” of the 
system are linked to the eigenvalues. So far Connes has shown that 
the energy levels correspond to non-trivial zeros of the zeta 
function and have real parts equal to ½. What is yet to be shown is 
that this includes all the non-trivial zeros. If yes, then the Riemann 
hypothesis would be true. !
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 I am leaving aside some very sophisticated alternatives, like the „epistemic“ one put 1
forward by Christopher Pincock in se ries of papers and then in the Mathematics and 
Scientific Representation book (Oxford University Press, 2012), hoping to address them 
at some other occasion.
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If prime numbers can be organized into a structure completely analogous 
to structure governing quantum systems, then the structural coincidence 
(all the way to isomorphism) is obvious. As Jim says: 
In the Riemann hypothesis example, physics, in the form of 
quantum mechanics does not motivate the problem (since the 
hypothesis is older than quantum theory); rather it guides us in a 
possible solution to the problem. 
Let me point out possible connections of strong presence alternative in 
two areas, epistemology pure and epistemology connected with 
metaphysics. 
The first has to do with applicability, and concerns the solution of a 
problem that we might call The Beautiful Mind Problem, that is related to 
the Cartesian doubt from madness. . The beginning of Beautiful Mind 
book ”( Silvia Nasar, 1998, Simon & Schuster) reports Nash saying that 
he gets his intimation about extraterrestrials “from the very same source” 
from which he gets his mathematical intuitions (his statement is printed 
on the cover). A skeptic might appeal to this report and direct our 
attention to the phenomenology of armchair thought and claim the 
following. It is possible coherently to imagine states of irrational quasi-
understanding, (quasi-) inferring and (quasi-) proof-following that are 
phenomenally indistinguishable from rational understanding, inferring 
and proof-following. Due to phenomenological indistinguishability, it is 
impossible to tell from the first-person perspective whether one is in such 
irrational state. Indeed, there is a fair chance that the actual pathology of 
thought exhibits such phenomena: some scenarios of such occasional 
attacks is not only possible, but seems to be actual. Therefore, even if one 
is de facto in the rational state, one cannot know this by reflection alone. 
Therefore one cannot in general know that one is undergoing an episode 
of rational understanding, rational inferring and proof-following, in 
contrast to their irrational counterparts.  2
Now, applicability offers a solution. Nash's equilibrium theorems can be 
applied in economics, and have very successfully been so, whereas his 
info about extraterrestrials made no carrier at all. Successful application 
can justify pure mathematical speculation. This brings us close to the 
tradition of indispensability argumentation. Now, what is the right format 
for such considerations? !
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 This is, of course, a variant of the argument from demon and madness, anticipated by 2
Descartes, sketched by some of his interpreters, like, for instance H. Frankfurt and B. 
Williams, and developed by C. Wright, the Dreamers and Madmen Argument, as we 
might call it, borrowing from the title of Frankfurt’s book.
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My proposal is that it is the two level epistemology, proposed by authors 
like Ernst Sosa and John Greco.  The first level is immediate 3
justification; they derive it from reliability, but I would add obviousness, 
especially for math. The second level is the reflective one, bringing 
together all other considerations that speak in favor of mathematical 
belief. Applicability as well as indispensability show their justificatory 
potential here: mathematical reasoning has proved to be massively 
successful, so why could not a reflective thinker appeal to this past 
success as one reason for her trust? This widens the basis for legitimating 
the belief, bringing in some a posteriori elements. Our philosopher is not 
thereby becoming a fanatical Quinean. She can, in defiance to reliability, 
retain the obviousness and compellingness as her immediate reason. But 
if questioned further, about credential of such immediate obviousness, 
she might reply that it has not deceived her ever, and has been 
empirically successful. So, these more holistic, success-involving 
considerations might be taken in the usual way to indicate objective 
reliability of one’s methods. This is the way realism functions in science 
and in commonsense. A good, probably the best, explanation of success is 
truth(-likeness) and reliability. Logic is, of course used in the process of 
integration, and is at the same time justified by its role in it; it integrates 
itself by helping the thinker to integrate the whole of one’s beliefs. But 
the circle is virtuous, not vicious, the alleged circularity being the usual 
circularity of holistic, coherentist justification. 
Notice the symmetrical opposite case: Perceptual beliefs get integrated 
with the rest with the help of massive use of deductive logic and (often, 
but not always) inductive schemas which are to a large extent a priori. So, 
the empirical gets mixed with the a priori, the same way in which the 
armchair gets integrated with the empirical. 
So much for the importance of applied mathematics for epistemology of 
mathematics. 
Let me pass to the second issue, our contact with mathematical reality. 
How do we access mathematical items (“MIs” for short) ? For instance, 
concrete and abstract patterns, arithmetical and geometrical, then 
numerical properties (cardinality, ordinal position), numbers themselves, 
sets and the like? Benacerraff's dilemma has been the main puzzle in the 
area. Jim answers it by appeal to analogy with the perceptual knowledge:  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Benacerraf remarks that the nature of abstract objects ‘places them 
beyond the reach of the better understood means of human 
cognition (e.g., sense perception and the like)’ (1973, 409). But 
how much more do we know about physical perception than 
mathematical intuition? In the case of ordinary visual perception 
of, say, a teacup, we believe that photons come from the physical 
teacup in front of us, enter our eye, interact with the retinal 
receptors and a chain of neural connections through the visual 
pathway to the visual cortex. After that we know virtually nothing 
about how beliefs are formed. The connection between mind and 
brain is one of the great problems of philosophy. Of course, there 
are some sketchy conjectures, but it would be completely 
misleading to suggest that this is in any way ‘understood’. Part of 
the process of cognition is well understood; but there remain 
elements which are just as mysterious as anything the platonist has 
to offer. The Laboratory of the Mind: Thought Experiments in the 
Natural Sciences, Routledge, 1993 p. 65. 
And he notes that even the simplest perceptual connections have 
something mysterious about them. 
Let’s face it: we simply do not know how the chain of physical 
events culminates in the belief that the teacup is full. Of course, we 
should not glory in this state of ignorance. I suggest only that 
mathematical intuition is no more mysterious than the final link in 
physical perception. We understand neither; perhaps some day we 
will understand both. (Ibid.) 
However, the puzzle remains. My proposal, very brief one is that we 
intuit the concrete MIs (instantiated patterns, pairs, trios, quartets of 
things of all sorts) and we reason to the more abstract ones. Assume that 
there are real (mathematical) features of the world. Then, elementary 
math captures some real (mathematical) features of the world. So, I want 
to build my account by developing and correcting the extant pattern-
recognition based epistemological proposals, and detaching them from 
narrowly structuralist ontology: 
Here are the steps: first, mathematical items, MIs (properties, structures, 
etc.) are instantiated in nature. (The view formulated by classics like 
Aristotle (Met. M,3, see the Oxford edition 1976 and comments by Julia 
Annas ) and nicely accounted for by structuralists. Second, instantiated 
MIs play a role in explanation, therefore, instantiated MIs can explain our 
(initial) knowledge of mathematical objects. Consider first the 
instantiation: Stewart Shapiro has put the point nicely stressing the 
structure as the common denominator: 
"My account of the relationship between mathematics and science 
begins with the suggestion that the contents of the non-
mathematical universe exhibit underlying mathematical structure 
in their interrelations and interactions. For example, it might be  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claimed that a mathematical structure similar to the inverse-square 
variation of real numbers is exemplified in the mutual attraction of 
physical objects. In general, physical laws expressed in 
mathematical terms can be construed as proposals that a certain 
mathematically defined structure is exemplified in a particular area 
of physical reality" (Mathematics and Reality, Phil. of Science, 
dec. 1983., p. 538). 
Partly innate competence have originally developed in ordinary 
interaction with ordinary objects, and they are being honed in practice. 
For instance, once you have a series representing numerosity, the 
manipulation of such a series can illustrate simple numerical operations. 
It makes obvious simple arithmetical truths, or at least their applied 
variants, like for instance, that 3 strokes added to 2 strokes make 5 
strokes. Indeed putting together a three series, "III", and a two series ,"II", 
yields a five series: "IIIII The contents of such intuitions seem to be 
concrete instances of mathematical structures, in this case of natural 
number. (See Parsons Mathematics in Philosophy, Cornell UP, 1983.p.43 
ff.) We do intuit the concrete mathematical items (instantiated patterns, 
pairs, trios, quartets of things of all sorts), and, as Frege would put it 
seeing what number is as if through a mist. How is this possible? 
The problem is simple to state but quite deep. Of course, we do perceive 
objects and our perception concentrates upon similarities in color, overall 
shape and Gestalt-organization, and, when faced with a choice, disregards 
more abstract similarities like the numerical one. Therefore, as against the 
structuralist mainstream, Parsons and Resnik in particular, no purely 
perceptual device would do for recognizing instantiated (structural) 
mathematical properties. 
Typically perceptual properties like shape, color, gestalt-features in 
general are manifestly unsuitable. The conceptualist critics then often 
suggest that the number concept is the only one which would. Intuition 
would then be demoted from its role of providing the first contact with 
numerical properties. We hope to have found a middle road, with the hint 
from the cognitive research: simple, pre-conceptual, or, at most proto-
conceptual operations are sufficient to ensure the right initial 
classification (typing) of particular items into numerically relevant types. 
Further, the operations might at the outset be performed by purely 
unconscious, mechanical, image-based or proto-computational routines. 
Their initial result might be that the beginner (a child) treats sequences as 
if they were classified by their proto-numerical properties. Later on, part 
of the procedure--or even the procedure as a whole might become 
conscious, r even an object of reflective attention and deliberation, but 
retaining the same abstract structure, the very scaffolding which filters 
out the right properties. we reason to the non-instantiated ones. We thus 
have indirect contact with “original” mathematical universals, and a 
naturalistically explainable competence.  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Note that the definition of equinumerosity in terms of matching (1-1 
correlation) suggests that one can establish it by imaginatively matching 
the elements of two or more collections. Now if basic imaginative 
intuitions are really fundamental for acquiring numerical knowledge, and 
if that knowledge does concern abstract properties, it follows that 
imagination can reveal abstract properties. If this holds, an account based 
on such assumption might (and I hope would) explain in a non-question 
begging way how the abstractness of the target properties is compatible 
with their quasi-perceptual detection. But how can abstract numerical 
properties be thus detected? 
Let me start with a typical quandary. A child can figure out that there as 
many eggs in the refrigerator as there are fingers on her hand. But “how 
many” question has no definite answer for simple collections or 
aggregates, Frege has taught us. Later we started believing that we need 
sets in order to talk about the same number of things. Casullo has nicely 
put the point many years ago: 
"… from the epistemic point of view, it is essential that number be 
a property of aggregates of spatio-temporal particulars such as 
apples. On the other hand, when we turn to the semantic 
requirements of a plausible analysis of mathematical propositions, 
number must be treated as a property of sets" (Casullo, A. 
“Causality, Reliabilism and Mathematical Knowledge,” Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research, sept.1992,v.LII NO.3, p. 565.) 
The five eggs in my refrigerator are not a set in my refrigerator, indeed. 
However, a plurality of objects already identified as eggs, comes close to 
instantiating a set. Since the child normally perceives the objects as 
apples, rather than as collections of disparate parts, she has at her disposal 
the minimal means to correlate the objects with her fingers, again 
perceived and thought of as being a single object each. 
Structuralism offers us a plausible metaphysics to be combined with the 
epistemic message from cognitive science. In a nutshell, the idea is that 
the initial degree of abstractness is achieved through the choice of the 
right operation: being insensitive to many concrete properties--color, size, 
and the like--the matching detects the abstract structural property of 
(equi-)numerosity. This goes a long way towards solving the problem of 
'perceiving' concrete objects as instances of abstract number-structure. Of 
course, the proposal is also compatible with less Platonic views than the 
ones of mainstream structuralists, like Parsons and Shapiro; it is 
compatible with Neo-aristotelian views (such as, for instance James 
Franklin’s from his Philosophy of Mathematics-Mathematics as the 
Science of Quantity and Structure, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), and with 
even more deflationary views; however its strength lies in its 
compatibility with ambitious structuralist Platonist proposals.  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We have innate mental-neural mechanisms (selected for) recognizing 
proto-mathematical relations, such as one-one matchability; they have 
developed in our evolutionary history (apparently some birds can match 
small collections of objects) for obvious advantages they bring. This 
gives the “magical ingredient” that has to be added to perception in order 
to yield the capacity to recognize numerical properties. There are simple 
imaginative or quasi-perceptual operations which detect such proto-
numerosity and enable the naïve cognizer to use concrete sequences as 
representatives of their abstract types, e.g. a s2equence of strokes as an 
instance-example of its (mathematical) sequence-type. The detection is 
not mysterious. The abstract property, numerosity, is represented by the 
relational property of matchability, and matchability can be detected by 
actual matching. 
However a critic might attack us at this juncture (I have had two of them, 
Majda Trobok and my student Zsolt Novak, (who found inspiration in 
Balaguer,(1998), Platonism and anti-platonism in mathematics, Oxford 
University Press) and I thank both. She or he might represent the 
reasoning in question in a Frege-like way: 
Since apples and fingers are 1-1 related, their number is the same. 
But, the antecedent here is concrete, whereas the consequent introduces 
an abstract platonic object, number. The child can see that the antecedent 
holds, not that the consequent does. 
To see who wins, we need an understanding of abstractness. Alternative 
notions of abstractness have been central to philosophy since the earliest 
records of the discipline too. In the current literature, there are at least 
three notions that must be clearly distinguished from each other. The first 
can be contrasted with the notion of concreteness, the second with the 
idea of particularity, while the third with the concept of spatiotemporality.  
In the first sense of the term, something is abstract if and only if it can 
exist merely as an aspect of a concrete entity. Autonomous existence, 
some philosophers say, is the privilege of concrete entities. On this 
construal, properties of concrete individuals, such as the colour of this 
rose in front of me, count as abstract entities, while concrete objects that 
can exist only outside space and time, such as the number one, do not. 
In the second sense of the term, something is abstract if and only if it can 
be fully present at various spatiotemporal locations. On this 
understanding, universal properties, such as the property of redness in 
general, are abstract entities, while the particular instances of this 
property or the particular objects of a non-spatiotemporal domain are not. 
Finally, in the third sense of the term, something is abstract if and only if 
its existence is atemporal (i.e. it exists, if at all, outside the natural world).  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Adopting this construal, atemporal objects and properties, such as 
numbers, ante rem structures, the content of Kantian categorical 
imperatives, moral values, Fregean senses, propositions, inferential 
relations and truth values, are abstract entities, while universal properties 
instantiated in space and time, or the particular instances themselves, are 
not. (I am using formulations that Zsolt proposed in his dissertation). 
Zsolt noted that the subject matter of a thought or sentence can be 
abstract without being platonic in character. Directions, for instance, as 
universal properties can characterise fictive and real spatiotemporal 
objects as well. An account of our ability to refer to and acquire 
knowledge of abstract entities may therefore amount to a platonist 
response to Benacerraf’s challenge only if the subject matter of this 
knowledge is abstract in the required sense of the term. In contrast to the 
numerical terms of pure mathematics, however, the denoting expressions 
appearing on the left hand side of the instances of Frege’s Abstraction 
Principle do not necessarily stand for abstract entities in the required 
sense of the term (i.e. they do not necessarily stand for strictly non-
spatiotemporal entities). 
Let us apply this to our example. The expression ‘the number of apples in 
front of me’, for instance, primarily stands for a property of a group of 
objects in the spatiotemporal world, rather than for an object of a platonic 
realm. Other denoting phrases, such as the expression ‘the number of 
primes between 70 and 80’, refer to a property of non-spatiotemporal 
entities, but the contextual definitions provided by Hume’s Principle in 
these examples presuppose that we already acquired some concepts and 
knowledge of a non2spatiotemporal domain. Putting it briefly, what the 
account seems to explain is how we can develop new concepts of certain 
fields from some earlier acquired ones of the very same fields. What it 
fails to explain is how we develop our notions of entities that cannot 
appear in space and time in the first place, maybe relying on our notions 
acquired earlier of entities appearing in space and time. 
Let me appeal to the idea of degrees of concreteness connected to the 
three senses of “abstract”: the child sees that the two pluralities have 
something, a pattern, in common, and this is abstractness in the first, and 
perhaps second sense. Later, she can use the number-word as attribute for 
describing pluralities (of previously identified particulars), and this is not 
totally misleading; indeed, Russell held the view that number is an 
attribute, not a singular term. Next, at some adult stage, one has first, a 
number word as a name for abstract object, then, if one reflects a lot, a 
proto-theory about it. 
Number is not abstracted from things in ways colors,…, are, Frege 
famously said in his Foundations, § 45. I agree, it is arrived at indirectly, 
through concrete pluralities. Pattern-recognition story is not a non-contact 
account, if we count indirect contact as contact (which we do: contact 
through gloves, boxing gloves, and even through skype).  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On any reasonable pattern-recognition story we come in touch with 
Platonic mathematical objects indirectly:one has first, direct (perceptual, 
and quasi-perceptual intuitional contact with instantiated MIs, then 
indirect contact with their abstract “originals” (at late, proto-theoretical 
stage). This is the way up through thorns to the platonic stars. !
And to conclude, I would have never written about such topics had it not 
been Jim's early and lasting influence! So again, thanks a lot!
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